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THE SPLIT IN THE CAPITALIST WORLD 
The rejection of Britain's bid to enter the European Com-
mon Market marks the biggest setback for United States global 
policy since the victory of the Chinese Revolution in 1949. It 
seems likely that a radically new period of postwar history is 
opening. 
To understand why this is so, it is necessary to have in 
mind a conception of the general aims of American policy, of 
what has been called Washington's "Grand Design" for the 
world of the second half of the 20th century. This design has of 
course never been laid down in a precise blueprint, but its main 
outlines are well known and have been described in general 
terms in innumerable public pronouncements. For example, in 
his 1961 trade expansion message to Congress, President Ken-
nedy said: 
The combined output and purchasing power of the United 
States and Western Europe-nearly a trillion dollars a year-is 
more than twice as great as that of the entire Sino-Soviet world. 
Though we have ,only half the population, and far less than half 
the terri tory, we can pool our resourcefulness in an open trade 
partnership strong enough to outstrip any challenge, and strong 
enough to undertake all the many enterprises around the world 
which the maintenance and progress of freedom require. If we 
can take this step, Marxist predictions of "capitalist" empires 
warring over markets and stifling competition would be shattered 
for all time-Communist hopes for a trade war between these two 
economic giants would be frustrated-and Communist efforts to 
split the West would be doomed to failure. 
One need only know that in official Washington language 
"partnership" means American control, to see in this statement a 
bold claim to United States hegemony over the "free world." 
This is the keystone of the "Grand Design," and the way it is to 
be implemented can be deduced from the specific decisions and 
policies of the present administration and those which preceded 
it in office during the past two decades. To put the matter in 
the simplest possible terms, American hegemony is to be achieved 
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and perpetuated in two ways: first, through an American 
empire organized and directed from Washington; and, second, 
through two subordinate empires headed respectively by the 
Common Market expanded to include Britain, and Japan. Each 
of the two subordinate empires is to be organized and directed 
from its own metropolis, with Washington retaining an ulti-
mate veto power over policies and decisions which are deemed 
inimical to the interests of the "free world" as a whole, that 
is to say, inimical to the interests of the American ruling class 
as interpreted in Washington. All three metropolises-the An1eri-
can, the European, and the Japanese-have a free rein to ex-
ploit their own empires through long-term investments, pro-
vision of banking and other services, controlling import and 
export trade, and so on. The U.S. participates in the exploita-
tion of the subordinate empires primarily through investment 
in the metropolises-the form of U. S. foreign investment which 
has tended to be quantitatively predominant in the last few 
years. 
The techniques in use for achieving these results are varied 
and numerous. First, there is the crucially important ideological 
justification for the acceptance by all concerned of U. S. he-
gemony. This of course is the Communist menace, compounded 
of the threat of Soviet ( and/ or Chinese) aggression and the 
threat of internal subversion. All countries in the "free world" 
are supposed to be in mortal danger from one or both of these 
threats; they all therefore need U. S. military protection and 
none can afford to go it alone for fear of being picked off one 
at a time. Granted these premises, the legitimacy of U. S. hegem-
ony, indeed the urgent necessity for it, follows automatically. 
In the light of this, it is not surprising that the propagation 
of anti-Communism becomes the central task of all intellectual 
and educational effort by the American ruling class. To the ex-
tent that the anti-Communist message gets through to the masses 
in the dependent countries, their very dependency acquires a 
popular base. 
Economically, U. S. hegemony is buttressed by a wide 
variety of techniques depending on the particular situation and 
requirements of the different dependencies. Private investment, 
government loans, monopolization of vital imports or exports, 
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control over important technologies-these are examples of the 
kinds of leverage exercised by the U. S. on the dependent 
economies. In this connection, however, an important fact must 
be noted: because of vigorous economic development in Europe 
and Japan during the past decade or so, U . S. economic leverage 
on the subordinate empires is much less than it used to be. As 
far as Western Europe is concerned, indeed, it can now be said 
that full economic independence has been achieved. 
Politically, the methods employed by the United States 
range from a complicated network of pacts and alliances to the 
classical techniques of divide-and-rule practiced by all the great 
empire builders of the past. Dependencies are graded in a 
hierarchical scale of status and privilege; rivalry for favor is 
encouraged and the contestants are suitably rewarded or pun-
ished; excessive power concentrations are either prevented from 
forming or are watered down if they occur. It is in this connec-
tion that the matter of British entry into the Common Market 
acquires its transcendent importance for American policy. The 
United States encouraged the formation of the Comrron Market 
by the original Six (France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, 
Netherlands, and Luxembourg) and then saw it grow rapidly 
in coherence and strength. The threatened emergence of a 
powerful rival was an obvious danger that had to be countered. 
The tactic chosen by the U. S. was to push Britain, the most 
privileged ally, into the Market, thereby ensuring that U. S. 
interests would at all times be respected. After British entry, 
the cohesiveness of the grouping would be further weakened by 
the adherence of some or all of Britain's partners in the Euro-
pean Free Trade Association (Austria, Denmark, Norway, Por-
tugal, Sweden, and Switzerland). French President de Gaulle, 
in his famous news conference of January 14th, foresaw the 
results with great clarity: a community increasing in this way, 
he said, 
would be faced with the pr.oblerns of its economic relations with 
all sorts of other nations and, first of all, with the United States. 
It is to be foreseen that the cohesion of its members, who would be 
very numerous and very different w.ould not stand up for long and 
that in the last resort it would appear as a colossal Atlantic 
Community dependent upon a control by the United States and 
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which would have soon absorbed the community of Europe. (N ew 
York Times, Western Edition, January 15, 1963.) 
The military means of ensuring American hegemony again 
vary according to the specific situation of the various de-
pendencies. Financial aid for purchase of American weapons 
plus military training missions may be sufficient to guarantee 
the loyalty to Washington of dominant military establishments 
in some of the weaker dependencies. One-sided treaties pro-
viding for U. S. military bases create quasi-occupation regimes. 
Integrated commands, such as those which characterize the 
NATO military setup, have the effect of bringing part of the 
allies' forces under direct American control. Finally, and most 
important vis-a.-vis the leaders of the subordinate empires, the 
United States aims to maintain an absolute and pre-emptiv( 
military preponderance by preventing any of its allies from 
achieving an effective nuclear capability. 
Such, in briefest outline, is the Grand Design for a "free 
world" run from Washington. If it could be realized- if all 
the parts could be put together and made to function smoothly 
-the United States could then proceed to attempt a settlement 
with the socialist world, either through a continuation and in-
tensification of the Cold War or, much less likely, through some 
sort of an agreement to live and let live. 
Now it is clear that the rejection of Britain's bid to join 
the Common Market, together with the closely related refusal 
of France to accept the U. S. plan for a so-called multilateral 
nuclear force (in reality a device for perpetuating America's 
atomic monopoly in the "free world"), have dealt a shattering 
blow to all Washington'S calculations. The concentration of 
power represented by the Common Market is not to be w.atered 
down by the admission of the most favored ally of the United 
States. It can hardly be over-emphasized that this has far more 
than merely negative significance. The Common Market group-
ing will naturally go on building up its power, and the United 
States will either go on trying to bring it under control or set 
about breaking it up. Whichever aim the U. S. pursues, the 
two power centers are now certain to develop as antagonists in 
a continuing and intensifying struggle. In the world of power 
politics, there is simply no middle road between subordination 
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and struggle for supremacy. The rejection of Britain's entry 
was at the same time the Market's rejection of subordination; 
from now on there can only be struggle. 
The French decision to go ahead with the development of 
an independent nuclear capability was a logical corollary and 
necessary complement of the rejection of Britain's entry. Nor 
does this decision have only military significance. In the world 
as it is constituted today, technological independence neces-
sarily implies military independence. If France were to re-
nounce the development of nuclear weapons, she would at the 
same time be putting shackles on her own scientific-techno-
logical development. She would, in other words, be accepting 
technological as well as military subordination to the United 
States. (France is the country principally involved at the mo-
ment, but it goes without saying that the other members of 
the Six, especially West Germany, will soon be fully immersed 
in the military-technological race- according to some accounts, 
the French atomic effort is already in reality a Franco-German 
effort.) _ 
One part of the American Grand Design, perhaps the 
most important part, thus lies in ruins. The nucleus of what 
was to have been the subordinate European empire has opted 
out and now has no choice but to try to build an independent 
empire. The "free world," far from being united under U. S. 
leadership, is divided against itself and threatened with in-
ternecine strife. 
But this is still not all. Though it is perhaps not yet obvi-
ous, recent events cannot help having a serious undermining ef-
fect on the anti-Communist ideology which, as previously noted, 
provides the sole justification for America's claim to "free 
world" hegemony. Not that the Common Market is any less 
impeccably anti-Communist than the United States, of course. 
The point is that by taking the course they are now embarked 
upon, the Six are in effect laughing at the whole elaborate pre-
tense that there is a danger of aggression from the Soviet Union. 
As Walter Lippmann put it even before the rejection of Britain's 
entry bid: 
European and American feelings differ about how urgent, 
immediate, and earth-shaking is the Soviet challenge. Our European 
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allies are not getting ready to call up reserves, and they are much 
less hot and bothered about Mr. Khrushchev than we are .... 
Quite evidently, though as well aware as any man of the chal-
lenge from the Soviet Union, General de Gaulle does not consider 
it a risk to sidetrack Great Britain, to alienate the Commonwealth, 
and to cold shoulder the United States. (New York Herald Tribune, 
November 13, 1962.) 
And the decision to develop an independent nuclear 
capability merely underlines the same point. France's deterrent 
power will not be a reality for several years at best. Can even 
a schoolboy believe that it has anything to do with fear of an 
attack on Western Europe by the USSR? De Gaulle is saying 
in no uncertain terms that the Soviet Union is no military 
threat to anyone. That particular bogey, which in the past has 
been such a reliable weapon in the American arsenal, seems 
about played out. The consequence should be a world-wide 
loosening of the bonds that tie the dependencies of the United 
States to the metropolis. 
It may be said that our whole argument rests on a shaky 
foundation, that the sharp turn events have taken in the last 
few months is the work of two old men deluded by dreams of 
their countries' past greatness, and that when they have departed 
the scene, or perhaps even sooner, everything will revert to 
normal: Britain will be admitted to the Common Market and 
Europe will slip back into its appointed place in the American 
Grand Design. This is certainly the hope of the United States 
and, what is more important, there need be no doubt that 
Washington will move heaven and earth to see that the hope 
comes true. 
This line of argument-or for that matter any other that 
rests on a personalist interpretation of the Common Market 
and its policies-we find completely unconvincing. It is no doubt 
true, as we are continuously being told, that de Gaulle is a 
power-hungry megalomaniac obsessed with the idea of the 
grandeur of France, that he is now the exclusive architect of 
French policy, that Adenauer's support has been of crucial im-
portance, and that there is widespread opposition to the two old 
autocrats throughout the Common Market. What the argument 
neglects to say is that de Gaulle and Adenauer would not be 
able to hold the positions and exercise the power they do unless 
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they had the backing of the decisive sectors of the French and 
German ruling classes. If this is so, as we believe it is, the c.on-
clusion which follows is that their departure from the scene 
is most unlikely to lead to any basic changes in the nature or 
policies of the Common Market. 
These policies are to gain political and military inde-
pendence of the United States, build up the power of the group 
internally, and expand its possessions and spheres of influence 
abroad. It seems to us beyond any question that these are the 
policies which the Big Business rulers of France and Germany 
have historically pursued whenever they have been in a position 
to do so. That they did not for roughly a decade and a half after 
World War II was because they were not in a position to, not 
because they didn't want to. During that period they were de-
pendent on U. S. economic aid, and they accepted political 
and military subordination as its price. By now, however, they 
have recovered their economic independence, and it is wholly 
natural that they should move to recover their political and 
military independence as well. Moreover, their economic 
strength, joined to that of their partners in the Six, is ample to 
sustain all-around independence and to enable them to con ... 
template with equanimity, nay with eagerness, a struggle for 
supremacy against the United States. The personal attitudes and 
wishes of de Gaulle and Adenauer thus correspond to the ob-
jective needs of the classes they represent. It is so with all "great" 
historical politicians and statesmen. 
What, then, is the source of the opposition to de Gaulle 
and Adenauer inside the Common Market? This is an interest-
ing subject which would repay careful study. We would suggest 
that there are three main sources. 
First, and probably least important, there are segments of 
the ruling class, probably relatively small, which stand to lose 
from the exclusion of Britain or from other policies now being 
adopted (producers selling to the British market, importers of 
grain from the U. S. and Canada, etc.). 
Second, there are all those who are directly or indirectly 
dependent on U. S. private investments in the Common Market 
countries. Though, as is well known, U. S. investment in the 
area has been rising steeply in recent years, the size and im-
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portance of this group should not be over-estimated. According 
to latest available Commerce Department figures, the value of 
U. S. direct investments in France in 1961 was $841 million, 
in Germany $1,170 million, and in the Common Market as 
a whole $3,041 million. These figures compare with $3,523 
million in Britain and $11,804 million in Canada. * In other 
words, continental Europe is still not an area of extreme U. S. 
investment concentration. In relative terms, a well informed 
French writer has estimated that U. S. investments in France 
account for between 5 and 6 percent of the national total, and 
the proportion cannot be significantly different for West Ger-
many or the Market as a whole.** Quite clearly, the apparent-
ly widespread notion that the U. S. monopolies through direct 
investments have grabbed control of the continental economies 
is a myth. (The very much higher concentration in Britain, 
incidentally, obviously helps to explain why Washington is so 
anxious to shoehorn Britain into the Market.) 
The third, and we would judge by far the most important, 
source of opposition to the de Gaulle-Adenauer course comes 
from the vested political and bureaucratic interests that have 
grown up during the years of European subordination to the 
United States. Most of Western Europe's leading politicians and 
civil servants have climbed to their present positions during this 
period. Their most valued skill has been their ability to get 
along with and get results from the trans-Atlantic benefactor. 
Those infected with anti-Americanism (a varied group to be 
sure but certainly including everyone with a strong sense of 
personal and national dignity) have been shunted aside or de-
nied promotion. As a result of this process of selection, the 
governing elite in Western Europe has acquired a thoroughly 
lackeyized mentality: they do not want independence from the 
United States, they fear it in much the same way that the ruling 
classes in Latin America fear it, and they will do their best to 
prevent its realization. It is, above all, this opposition that 
de Gaulle and Adenauer must overcome. 
*Samuel Pizer and Frederick Cutler, "Expansion in U.S. Investments 
Abroad," Survey of Current Business, August 1962, p. 22. 
**Jacques 1tIalterre, "L'Europe Colonisee," France Observateur, 
February 7, 1963. 
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There are two main reasons for believing that they will 
succeed. In the first place, as already indicated, the great trusts 
and combines which are at least as dominant in the European 
economies as their counterparts are on this side of the Atlantic, 
have every interest in independence from the United States. In 
an historical sense, indeed, de Gaulle and Adenauer are merely 
their instruments in lifting the yoke of subservience to the United 
States which had to be endured during the period of postwar 
reconstruction. The conflict between the politicians and bureau-
crats on the one hand and the monopoly capitalists on the other 
is neatly illustrated by a recent report from Rome by the 
columnist Joseph Alsop. Describing the Italian reaction to 
de Gaulle's "bold attempt to transform the European Common 
Market into an exclusive, protectionist Europe inspired by a 
new 'continental nationalism,'" Alsop writes that 
the Italian government leaders, from President Segni and Prime 
Minister Fanfani down to the able pennanent officials in the 
ministries, are completely united in their distaste for the Gaullist 
conception of Europe. In the business and industrial communities, 
however, support for de Gaulle is already discernible. And this 
pro-de Gaulle tendency may grow importantly, especially if it is 
aided by clumsy American diplomacy. ( Washington Post., March 
6, 1963.) 
If this is the case in Italy, how much greater is de Gaulle's 
support likely to be in France and Germany which have even 
bigger and stronger monopolies as well as deep-rooted traditions 
of struggling for world leadership! We would say that this "pro-
de Gaulle tendency" (really a pro-independent imperialist 
tendency) is certain to grow, while the opposite tendency, repre-
sented by Segni, Fanfani, et aI, is equally certain to decline. 
The second main reason for believing in the success of 
the de Gaulle-Adenauer line is that it is likely to have genuine 
popular support. Nationalism is a two-edged weapon which 
operates differently in different situations. If the Common 
Market appeared in the eyes of Europeans as a device for 
perpetuating the dominance of the United States over its allies, 
nationalism would work against it. If, on the other hand, the 
Common Market appears as a device for throwing off American 
dominance and enhancing the relative standing of the European 
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member countries, then nationalism works for it. Since the 
de Gaulle-Adenauer policies obviously give the Market the 
latter character, it is safe to say that they can rely on nationalist 
support. It needs only to be added that Western Europe is the 
birthplace of modern nationalism and that there is no habit of 
mind that is more deeply ingrained in the European peoples. 
Observant reporters have noted that the events of recent months 
have already produced a marked change in attitude among 
Europeans. Writes Ray Vicker in the Wall Street Journal from 
Brussels: 
In the red plush interior ,of the Ondres Restaurant near the 
Theatre Royal de la Monnaie, a helpful waiter recommends the 
lobster entente cordiale to a hungry diner. Says he (in that lordly 
manner of European waiters): "It is much better than lobster a 
l' Americaine." 
That waiter's tone is being adopted by many another Eur.opean 
today when referring to American ideas-especially in the field of 
diplomatic policy. As a result, President Kennedy's "grand design" 
for an Atlantic partnership of Western nations faces rough sledding. 
Moreover, even if a grand design materializes, there are increasing 
signs that it will not have a made-in-America stamp on it, nor 
will the end product be entirely to American liking. (Wall Street 
Jourrnal, January 23, 1963.) 
If we are right that the de Gaulle-Adenauer policies serve 
the interests of the monopolists and express the nationalistic 
sentiments of the masses, there can hardly be any doubt that 
they will prevail over the pro-Americanism of the hack poli-
ticians and the bureaucrats. These gentlemen are either going to 
have to accept the new dispensation (which many of them will 
manage without too much difficulty) or else be replaced by 
others (of whom there are plenty waiting to step forward). 
Let us attempt now to survey some of the possible implica-
tions of the split in the capitalist world which is now opening 
up and in our judgment is certain to grow wider and deeper as 
time goes on. This is of course an enormous subject which could 
hardly be treated satisfactorily in a volume, let alone a brief 
essay. The following remarks should therefore be taken in the 
spirit in which they are offered, as suggestions for further 
thought and study. 
Taking the United States first, we may quote again from 
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the article by Ray Vicker in the Wall Street Journal of January 
23rd: 
For the U. S. that trend [toward an independent Europe] 
has some uncomfortable implications. Among them: Possible loss 
of a substantial part of its agricultural exports to Europe, tough 
bargaining before any trade concessions are won under the ad-
ministration's Trade Expansion Act, a fierce fight in those negotia-
tions over just about every exception to tariff cutting that may be 
advanced by U. S. negotiators to protect specific American in-
dustries, possible reorganization of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization, and continuation of national nuclear forces in the 
Western alliance. 
This by no means exhausts the list, of course. What is 
likely to be of particular importance is an intensified struggle 
for dependencies and spheres of influence in the underdeveloped 
areas of the world. During the past two decades, the United 
States has used its paramount position in the "free world" to 
steal one area after another from the older colonial empires 
and to add the stolen territories to its own string of dependencies. 
In this manner, South Korea, Taiwan, and Okinawa have been 
transferred from the Japanese empire to the American, South 
Vietnam has been transferred from the French empire, Pakistan 
and Iran from the British, and so on. Similarly, British and 
German investment and influence, once so prominent in South 
America, have been liquidated in some countries and sharply 
curtailed in others. With the re-establishment of a strong and 
independent imperialist power in Europe, however, this process 
of one-way transfers is likely to be halted and even reversed. 
The Congo perhaps offers us a preview of what is in store in 
other countries and continents. It probably requires no elaborate 
argument to prove that the Tshombe-Adoula struggle was at 
bottom a struggle of the Belgians to hold on to the extremely 
lucrative Katanga mining complex against the bold bid of the 
United States to use the UN to bring the whole Congo into the 
American sphere of influence. The fall of Tshombe seemed to 
signalize a resounding victory for the United States. And yet 
one of Adoula's first acts after this military denouement was 
to accept an invitation to visit Brussels. The resulting talks are 
said to have ended in "complete success .... A joint com-
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munique was issued after the last meeting between the Congolese 
Ministers and a Belgian delegation headed by Premier Theo 
Lefevre and Foreign Minister Paul-Henri Spaak. It said the 
talks had been conducted 'in a particularly cordial atmosphere' 
and had revealed 'a complete similarity of views between both 
governments.'" (New York Times) Western Edition, March 1, 
1963.) Belgium, it seems, is now seeking to buy Adoula out 
from under the Americans' noses, and with the wealth of 
Katanga still firmly in its grasp the chances of success would 
appear to be very favorable. Adoula evidently has every interest 
in playing the two off against each other with a view to finally 
selling out to the highest bidder. (The Congolese people of 
course have nothing but misery to gain from all this haggling 
over the right to exploit them, but their welfare is the last thing 
that any of the principals involved are concerned with.) 
Be that as it may, a world-wide struggle for empire is 
clearly in the offing, and the United States, having had every-
thing its way for two decades, is pretty sure to suffer some de-
feats and losses. At the same time, the price of local ruling 
groups will go up: competition among buyers, they say, al-
ways has the effect of ensuring a fairer price to sellers. All of 
which, it may be surmised, will not do much to solve the U. S. 
balance-of-payments problem or to stimulate a lagging domestic 
economy sorely in need of expanded overseas "living space." 
What about Britain? To begin with, one must understand 
that the door to the Common Market is by no means per-
manently closed to the British. As de Gaulle made quite clear 
at his January 14th press conference, they can enter any time 
they are ready to give up their special relation with the United 
States. In other words, they can enter if and when the effect of 
their entrance would be to strengthen the Common Market 
rather than transform it. The basic condition for such an entry 
is clear: cut all bilateral military ties to the U. S. and pool 
nuclear capabilities and research with those of the continental 
partners. The British would also have to bring as large a part 
of their remaining empire as possible into the Market on an 
associate membership basis like that · now held by most of 
France's ex-colonies in Africa. But there is no point in speculating 
further about this at the present time since it is perfectly clear 
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that the one thing the British are not prepared to do is give up 
their position as most favored ally of the United States. 
From this premise certain consequences flow. As the strug-
gle between the U. S. and the Common Market intensifies, 
Britain will inevitably be squeezed from both sides. Both will 
try to take away her markets and colonies (or neo-colonies), 
and as her situation deteriorates, she will be thrown into ever 
closer dependence on the United States. At some stage along 
this gloomy route British Big Business might decide that it 
would be better after all to throw in their country's lot with the 
Market. It is hard to see what other alternatives are now open 
to Britain. The idea of turning the Commonwealth into an in-
dependent (and liberal) third force in the "free world" is totally 
impractical, the more so since large parts of the Commonwealth 
are already under American domination (for example, Canada 
and Pakistan) and even larger parts appear to be in the process 
of falling under American domination (for example, India and 
Nigeria). The Commonwealth is much more likely to provide 
battlegrounds between the American and European empires 
than to form the basis of a British-led third force. If the Labor 
Party were a real socialist party, it might be able to lead Britain 
into the socialist camp where the country would enjoy inde-
pendence of both capitalist empires and could in addition find 
all the markets needed for rapid economic growth. But the 
Labor Party is not now a real socialist party and the day when 
it may become one is still apparently a long way off. 
As for the underdeveloped countries in the "free world," 
one must make a distinction. We have already suggested in 
connection with the Congo that the ruling groups can play 
the imperialist powers off against each other and thereby ex-
tract better terms for themselves. As far as the masses are con-
cerned, however, it makes hardly any difference whether they 
are exploited by Americans or Europeans, and it matters just as 
little whether the local agents of the imperialists are paid better 
or worse. If the masses are able to win genuine concessions, as 
sometimes they are, the reason is their own strength and 
militancy, not the competition of the imperialists for their favor. 
Imperialist rivalry is after all nothing new, and so far as we 
know there is not a single case in which it can be shown to have 
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benefited the people in the exploited lands. Rather the con-
trary: they are usually made to pay, in one way or another, 
the costs of deciding who is to have the privilege of battening 
off their misery. 
This does not mean that it is a matter of indifference to 
the peoples of the underdeveloped countries whether the im-
perialists are united or divided. Their real hope, their only real 
hope, is to escape altogether from the clutches of imperialism 
and to join the socialist world. Hence anything that weakens 
imperialism as a whole is good for them: their escape becomes 
that much easier. And anything that strengthens the socialist 
world is also good for them: more assistance can be given them 
both along the escape route and after they have reached their 
destination. It will probably be generally agreed that an im-
perialist system divided against itself is weaker than one united 
under a single leader and that on this count therefore, recent 
developments are altogether favorable to the real interests of 
the underdeveloped countries. That the split in the imperialist 
camp will actually strengthen world socialism, however, is less 
obvious. Still, we believe that it is both true and important. 
For one thing, the rift between the imperialist giants should 
serve materially to lessen the purely military pressure on the 
socialist countries. In more concrete terms, to the extent that 
West Germany gets caught up in a struggle against the United 
States for markets and spheres of influence, her attitude toward 
her neighbors to the East is bound to be affected. Germany 
has twice suffered military disaster as a result of fighting two-
front wars. Left to itself, the German ruling class might make 
the same mistake again, but there is less likelihood that the 
integrated ruling class of a Western European empire will do 
so. Its orientation will be more toward the Iberian peninsula in 
Europe and toward Africa and Latin America overseas. Under 
these circumstances, the working out of some sort of modus 
vivendi in Central Europe would become a realistic possibility. 
With the threat of German aggression thus reduced, the socialist 
countries of Eastern Europe could divert resources from military 
to civilian uses and in this way step up their rate of growth. 
Analagous considerations apply in the field of economic 
relations between capitalist Europe and socialist Europe. It is 
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well known that Western European capitalists (including Ger-
mans) have few if any scruples about trading with the East 
and that it has been American influence that has prevented 
them from doing so on a much larger scale. With the restraining 
grip of the Americans broken, this trade should flourish, to the 
great benefit of both sides. For the Western Europeans, this 
may well become a crucially important matter in the next few 
years. Their present boom, like all capitalist booms, rests on 
overproduction of capital goods. When creeping stagnation sets 
in, as it did in the United States already during the 50's,* the 
pressure of the big monopolies to open up new markets wiIl 
steadily mount. In part, this will take the form of intensified 
struggle against the Americans. But it wiIl also take the form of 
increased trading with the East, probably on more and more 
advantageous terms for the latter. That this will facilitate the 
rapid development of the socialist societies, not only in Europe 
but on all other continents as well, goes without saying. 
For the socialist world, then, the implications of the im-
perialist split are all favorable. And this means that for the 
peoples of the underdeveloped countries the implications are 
also favorable. But no one should misinterpret this statement. 
It does not mean that the peoples of the underdeveloped coun-
tries can expect any immediate or direct benefits from the 
quarrels of their imperialist masters. In the short run, indeed, 
they may suffer, as the Congolese have suffered during the 
last three years. What it does mean is that the conditions for 
overthrowing imperialist rule altogether are improving and will 
continue to improve. Weare clearly reaching a stage of world 
history when, for the poor and exploited who make up the vast 
majority of mankind, no other goal makes sense and therefore 
no other goal is worth striving for. 
(March 17, 1963) 
*Much of the European Left has succumbed to the view that "neo-
capitalism" is no longer subject to such ills. The Right has retained a better 
sense of proportion, as shown by the example of the arch-conservative 
Swedish economist Per Jacobsson, managing director of the International 
Monetary Fund: "Western Europe," he told a convention of the American 
Bankers Association, "is going to encounter more problems like those of the 
United States than it has in recent years." (New York Times, Western 
Edition, February 26, 1963.) 
THE SPLIT IN THE SOCIALIST WORLD 
The Review of the Month in the December, 1961, issue of 
MR was on the subject of the Sino-Soviet dispute. Since then a 
lot has happened, and a large amount of new or previously 
relatively inaccessible material has been published. * In the light 
of these developments, we have to Say quite frankly that our 
earlier analysis of the dispute does not stand up. It contains 
serious inaccuracies, the emphases are misplaced, and it now 
seems to us that the conclusions are untenable. But much more 
serious, the whole argument rested on a misconception of what 
the dispute is all about. 
What the Dispute Is About 
It is not about whether war is inevitable or how to minimize 
the danger of war or what the relations among Communist 
Parties should be-though these and many other questions are 
involvedr At bottom it is about the nature of the historical period 
through which the world is passing and what can and should be 
done to advance the cause of world socialism. 
The Russians and those who agree with them (including 
the leadership of most of the non-Asian Communist Parties) 
think that the over-riding issue of our time is war or peace, and 
that by comparison everything else is of secondary importance. 
If thermonuclear war comes, they argue, civilization itself will 
be destroyed or at any rate set back hundreds if not thousands 
of years, and the bright future which now seems to beckon the 
socialist countries will be ruined. On the other hand if war can 
* The following sources are particularly valuable: ( 1) Donald S. 
Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956-1961, Princeton, 1962. This book 
quotes from or summarizes the most important documents on both sides 
from the 20th Congress through the 22nd Congress of the CPUSSR. (2) 
Edgar Snow, The Other Side of the River: Red China Today, New York, 
1962. This 810-page work, perhaps the best general account of revolu-
tionary China to date, throws valuable light on the motivations and ideas 
of the Chinese leaders. (3) The following statements published by the 
Chinese CP: "The Differences between Comrade Togliatti and Us," 
Renmin Ribao, December 31, 1962; "Whence the Differences: A Reply 
to Thorez and Other Comrades," Renmin Ribao, February 27, 1963; and 
"More on the Differences between Comrade Togliatti and Us: Some 
Important Problems of Leninism in the Contemporary World," H ongqi, 
March 4, 1963. The last named is in fact a book of 199 pages which 
contains a detailed and authoritative statement of Chinese views. All of 
these, as well as other statements on the dispute, have been published 
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be avoided, the superiority of socialism over capitalism will be 
clearly demonstrated within a decade or two and the whole 
world will be irresistibly attracted into the socialist camp. 
The political line which follows from this analysis puts 
primary emphasis on three objectives: peaceful coexistence of 
countries with different social systems, disarmament, and peace-
ful transition from capitalism to socialism. These are treated-
for example, in the new program of the CPUSSR adopted at the 
22nd Congress in October, 1961-not merely as desirable but as 
actually attainable goals. This is a crucially important distinction 
which must be continuously kept in mind. The dispute in the 
socialist camp concerns not the desirability of these goals but 
their attainability, and attainability depends on reality not on 
wishes. 
War and Imperialism 
The Chinese, for their part, are emphatic in their espousal 
of a policy of peaceful coexistence. "The Chinese Communist 
Party and the Chinese government," we read in the first reply 
to Togliatti, "have always stood for peaceful coexistence be-
tween countries with different social systems." (Differences, p. 
22.) And again: "A socialist country has no antagonistic social 
contradictions . . . and it is absolutely unnecessary and im-
permissible for a socialist country to embark on wars of ex-
pansion. No world war can ever be started by a socialist country." 
(More on the Differences, p. 66.) But they are no less emphatic 
in their insistence that imperialism does not stand for peaceful 
coexistence, that imperialism is full of antagonistic social con-
tradictions, that it is in the nature of imperialism to embark on 
wars of expansion, and that imperialism can start a world war. 
These are, indeed, among the most basic tenets of Leninism, 
and they have been fully confirmed by history. Imperialist 
separately by the Foreign Languages Press, Peking. In what follows, 
references are to these separate editions, identified by short titles. On the 
Soviet side, many articles and speeches could be cited. Perhaps the best 
single source is Khrushchev's speech to the Supreme Soviet on December 
12, 1962, entitled "The Present International Situation and the Foreign 
Policy of the Soviet Union," published as a separate pamphlet by Cross-
currents Press, New York. 
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conflict has already been responsible for starting two world 
w.ars, and "the history of the 17 postwar years shows that local 
wars of one kind or another have never ceased." (Differences, 
p. 25.) In the three years 1960-1962 alone, the Chinese enume-
rate some 20 local wars or acts of imperialist aggression. (M ore 
on the Differences, pp. 60-63.) The conclusion follows with 
iron logic that "only after the imperialist system has been over-
thrown and only after all systems of oppression of man by man 
and of exploitation of man by man have been abolished, and 
not before, will it be possible to eliminate all wars and to reach 
'a world without war.'" (Differences, p. 25.) To believe other-
wise is not Leninism but bourgeois pacifism. 
This does not mean the Chinese think that a third world 
war is inevitable, still less that the world is going to be blown 
up in a thermonuclear holocaust. On these questions, as distinct 
from banning war altogether, they are even quite optimistic. 
Their reasoning, reduced to its essentials, is that just as the first 
two world wars resulted in vast losses of territory and popula-
tion to imperialism, so a third world war would finish the job, 
wiping imperialism off the face of the earth. If the forces 
opposed to imperialism and war can be effectively mobilized and 
the imperialists can be convinced that to start another world 
w.ar would be suicide, they can be deterred from doing it. With 
respect to atomic warfare, the Chinese hold that since "the 
secret of nuclear weapons has long since ceased to be a monop-
oly," it follows that "those who possess nuclear weapons and 
guided missiles cannot prevent other countries from possessing 
the same. In their vain hope of obliterating their opponents with 
nuclear weapons, the imperialists are, in fact, subjecting them-
selves to the danger of being obliterated." Therefore, "we have 
always maintained that it is possible to conclude an agreement 
for a total ban on nuclear weapons." (More on the Differences, 
p. 73.) And they call attention to the fact that "there are 
precedents for the oudawing of highly destructive weapons. One 
such precedent is the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use 
in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of 
Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, concluded by various na-
tions in 1925 at Geneva." (Differences, pp. 13-14.) But of 
course the possibility of avoiding a third world war or of out-
22 MONTHLY REVIEW 
lawing nuclear weapons is an entirely different matter from ban-
ning war altogether. That will be possible only after imperialism 
has been completely eliminated. 
To be sure, if the nature of imperialism had changed or if 
it were in the process of changing, this conclusion would no 
longer hold. But the Chinese contend that the changes which 
have taken place in imperialism, and in particular the decline 
of the old colonial empires, have in no way changed the nature 
of the beast. The United States has stepped into the shoes of the 
formerly dominant imperialist powers and "is carrying out a 
policy of expansion in all parts of the world ever since World 
War II." (More on the Differences) p. 27.) But this in no way 
affects the contradictions of the system. On the contrary: 
The U.S. imperialist policy of world hegemony inevitably 
intensifies the fight between the imperialist powers and between 
the new and old colonialists over colonies and spheres of influence; 
it also intensifies the struggles between U.S. imperialism with its 
policy of control and the other imperialist powers which are re-
sisting this control. These struggles affect the vital interests of 
imperialism, and the imperialist contestants give each other no 
quarter, for each side is striving to strangle the other. 
The policy of the U.S. imperialists and their partners towards 
the oppressed nations and people of Asia, Africa, and Latin 
America who are struggling for their own liberation is an extremely 
reactionary policy of suppression and deception. . . . 
The population of these areas in Asia, Mrica, and Latin 
America constitutes more than two thirds of the total population 
of the capitalist world. The ever-mounting tide of revolution in 
these areas and the fight over them between the imperialist powers 
and between the new and old colonialists clearly show that these 
areas are the focus of all the contradictions of the capitalist world; 
it may also be said that they are the focus of world contradictions. 
These areas are the weakest link in the imperialist chain and the 
storm center of world revolution.* (Ibid.) pp. 31-32.) 
* It is important to understand that in saying that "these areas are 
the focus of world contradictions," the Chinese definitely mean to include 
the contradictions between the capitalist and socialist systems. "In terms 
of the actual interests of the imperialist powers," they say in another 
passage, "these contradictions [in Asia, Africa, and Latin America] are more 
pressing, more direct, more immediate than their contradictions with the 
socialist countries." Ibid., p. 50. 
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The Chances of Disarmament 
In these circumstances, the Chinese evidently think that the 
prospects of any genuine disarmament are vanishingly small, so 
small indeed that they hardly bother to discuss the problem at 
all. In More on the Differences between Comrade Togliatti and 
Us, which is unquestionably their major theoretical pronounce-
ment, disarmament is brought up at only one place in the chapter 
on "War and Peace" and is quickly disposed of: 
That old-line opportunist Kautsky held that "war is a product 
of the arms drive," and that "if there is a will to reach agreement 
on disarmament," it "will eliminate one of the most serious causes 
of war." Lenin sharply criticized these anti-Marxist views of Kaut-
sky and other old-line opportunists who examined the causes of 
war without reference to the social system and the system of 
exploitation. 
In "The War Program of the Proletarian Revolution," Lenin 
pointed out that "only after the proletariat has disarmed the bour-
geoisie will it be able, without betraying its world-historical mission, 
to throw all armaments on the scrap heap; and the proletariat 
will undoubtedly do this, but only when this condition has been 
fulfilled, certainly not before.)) Such is the law of social develop-
ment, and it cannot be otherwise. 
Being incapable of explaining the question of war and peace 
from the historical and class angle, the modern revisionists always 
talk about peace and about war in general terms without making 
any distinction between just and unjust wars. Some people are 
trying to persuade others that the people's liberation would be 
"incomparably easier" after general and complete disarmament, 
when the oppressors would have no weapons in their hand's. In 
our opinion this is nonsensical 'and totally unrealistic and is putting 
the cart before the horse.* (Ibid., pp. 67-68. Emphasis in.original.) 
This low estimate of the chances of disarmament does not 
mean that the Chinese oppose the socialist countries' taking the 
* The reference may be to Soviet First Deputy Premier Mikoyan who 
was reported in the New York Times of March 15, 1962, as saying in a 
speech in Armenia that he "rejected the thesis that Mr. Khrushchev's 
disarmament proposals would hamper the national liberation movements. 
The Deputy Premier ... said that disarmament would strip the 'imperial-
ists' of the means of 'resisting the revolutionary actions of the proletariat 
and the peasantry.''' This very consequence of disarmament serves to 
explain why, in the Chinese view, Mr. Khrushchev's proposals are "totally 
unrealistic." 
24 MONTHLY REVIEW 
initiative in proposing disarmament: not to do so would be to 
abandon an effective propaganda weapon. But the Chinese 
evidently believe that to rely on disarmament as a means of 
promoting or insuring peace makes no sense. The threat of war 
comes not from armaments as such but from imperialism and 
can be countered only by fighting imperialism. Hence where the 
Soviet Union's political line centers on the struggle for peace and 
disarmament, that of the Chinese centers on the struggle against 
imperialism. 
How to Fight Imperialism 
How should the struggle against imperialism be carried on? 
The Chinese answer that it must be conducted on all levels and 
by all available methods. But since, as we have seen, they regard 
the underdeveloped countries of Asia, Mrica, and Latin America 
as "the weakest link in the imperialist chain," they naturally 
conclude that the key to a successful fight against imperialism 
is to be found in the revolutionary struggles of the peoples of 
those areas. Since this is the real heart of the Chinese position 
and the central issue in their dispute with the Soviet Union, a 
full statement of their views seems called for: 
A fundamental task is thus set before the international Com-
munist movement in the contemporary world, namely, to support 
the revolutionary struggles of the oppressed nations and people of 
Asia, Africa, and Latin America, because these struggles are de-
cisive for the cause of the international proletariat as a whole. In 
a sense, the revolutionary cause of the international proletariat as 
a whole hinges on the outcome of the people's struggles in these 
regions, which are inhabited by the overwhelming majority of the 
world's population, as well as on the acquisition of support from 
these revolutionary struggles. 
The revolutionary struggles in Asia, Mrica, and Latin America 
cannot be suppressed. They are bound to burst forth. Unless the 
proletarian parties in these regions lead these struggles, they will 
become divorced from the people and' fail to win their confidence. 
The proletariat has very many allies in the anti-imperialist struggle 
in these regions. Therefore ... the proletariat and its vanguard ... 
must march in the van . . . and be skillful in organizing their allies 
in a broad anti-imperialist and anti-feudal united front, exposing 
every deception practiced by the imperialists, the reactionaries, and 
the modern revisionists, and leading the struggle in the correct 
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direction. Unless all these things are done, victory in the revolu-
tionary struggle will be impossible, and even if victory is won, its 
consolidation will be impossible and the fruits of victory may fall 
into the hands of the reactionaries, with the country and the 
nation once again coming under imperialist enslavement. Experi-
ence, past and present, abounds in instances of how the people 
have been betrayed in the revolutionary struggle, the defeat of the 
Chinese Revolution in 1927 being a significant example. 
The proletariat of the capitalist countries in Europe and 
America, too, must stand in the forefront of those supporting the 
revolutionary struggles of the oppressed nations and people of Asia, 
Africa, and Latin America. In fact, such support simultaneously 
helps the cause of the emancipation of the proletariat in Europe 
and America. . . . Therefore the proletarian parties of the metro-
politan imperialist countries are duty bound to heed the voice of 
the revolutionary people in these regions, study their experience, 
respect their revolutionary feelings, and support their revolutionary 
struggles .... It should be understood that according to the teach-
ings of Marxism-Leninism, without a correct stand, line, and 
policy on the nationalli:beration movement and the people's revolu-
tionary movement in the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin 
America, it will be impossible for the workers' parties in the 
metropolitan imperialist countries to have a correct stand, line, 
and policy on the struggle waged by the working class and the 
broad masses of the people in their own countries. 
The national liberation movement and the people's revolu-
tionary movement in Asia, Africa, and Latin America give great 
support to the socialist countries; they constitute an extremely 
important force safeguarding the socialist countries from imperialist 
invasion. Beyond any doubt, the socialist countries should give 
warm sympathy and active support to these movements and they 
absolutely must not adopt a perfunctory or a selfishly national 
attitude, or an attitude of great-power chauvinism, much less 
hamper, obstruct, mislead, or sabotage these movements. Those 
countries in which socialism has been victorious must make it their 
sacred internationalist duty to support the national liberation 
struggles and the people's revolutionary struggles in other countries. 
Some people take the view that such support is but a one-sided 
"burden" on the socialist countries. This view is very wrong and 
runs counter to Marxism-Leninism. It must be understood that 
such support is a two-way, mutual affair; the socialist countries 
support the people's revolutionary struggles in other countries, 
and these struggles in turn serve to support and defend the socialist 
countries. (More on the Differences, pp. 45-47.) 
Revolutionary movements in the underdeveloped countries 
thus constitute the crucial factor in the all-important struggle 
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against imperialism. Proletarian parties must correctly lead these 
movements so as to prevent the kind of disastrous setback the 
Chinese Revolution suffered in 1927. The Left in the capitalist 
countries must understand and support these movements. And 
finally the socialist countries must provide them with all possible 
backing, not only as a matter of international solidarity but 
bec.ause this is the best way of weakening their own mortal 
enemy. As to the outlook, the Chinese are full of revolutionary 
optimism. "The present situation," they say, "is an excellent one 
for the people of the world. It is most favorable for the oppressed 
nations and people in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, for the 
proletariat and working people of the capitalist countries, for 
the socialist countries, and for the cause of world peace; it is 
unfavorable only for the imperialists and the reactionaries in all 
countries and for the forces of aggression and war." (More on 
the Differences, pp. 48-49.) The Chinese Communists carried 
out a successful fight of their own against imperialism and re-
actionaries despite seemingly insuperable odds; they believe that 
conditions are now much more favorable and that similar 
victories can be won by the other oppressed and exploited 
peoples of the world. 
Peaceful Competition and Peaceful Transition 
Nothing in all this should be taken to imply that the 
Chinese deny or minimize the importance of socialist successes 
in the economic competition with capitalism as a factor in pro-
moting the world revolution. They stress that "the superiority of 
the socialist system as demonstrated in the socialist countries is 
a source of great inspiration to the oppressed people and na-
tions," and quote Lenin approvingly as saying that "it is by our 
economic policy that we are exerting our main influence on the 
international revolution." They then go on to say, however: 
But Lenin never said that the building of a Soviet state could 
take the place of the struggles of all countries to liberate them-
selves. Historical events during the 40 years and more of the 
Soviet Union's existence also show that a revolution or a trans-
formation of the social system in any country is a matter for the 
people of that country, and that the policy of peaceful coexistence 
and peaceful competition followed by socialist countries cannot 
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possibly result in a change of the social system in any other country. 
What grounds have Togliatti and other comrades for believing 
that the pursuit of the policy of peaceful coexistence and peaceful 
competition by the socialist countries can change the face of the 
social system in every other country and establish an "economic and 
social order" capable of satisfying all the aspirations of men? (More 
on the Differences, p. 17.) 
The Chinese position, in other words, is that peaceful 
competition may spur revolutions in the nonsocialist countries 
but can never be a substitute for them. 
What about the possibilities of peaceful transition from 
capitalism to socialism? The Chinese subscribed to the Moscow 
Declaration (1957) and the Moscow Statement (1960) of the 
world's Communist Parties, both of which documents assert the 
possibility of such a peaceful transition; but it is apparent that 
they do not have very high hopes in this regard and that they 
consider exclusive reliance on peaceful methods of struggle to be 
dangerous in the extreme. "It would naturally be in the interests 
of the proletariat and the entire people if peaceful transition 
could be realized," they say. But "possibility and reality, the 
wish and its fulfillment, are two different things." Moreover, 
up to now, "history has not witnessed a single example of 
peaceful transition from capitalism to socialism." Still more 
im portan't : 
Even when it is possible to secure state power through peaceful 
means, one must be prepared to deal immediately with armed 
intervention by foreign imperialists and with counter-revolutionary 
armed rebellions supported by the imperialists. Communists should 
concentrate their attention on the accumulation of revolutionary 
strength through painstaking efforts and must be ready to fight 
back against armed attacks by the bourgeoisie whenever necessary. 
They should not lay one-sided stress on peaceful transition and 
concentrate their 'attention on this possibility; otherwise they are 
bound to benumb the revolutionary will of the proletariat, disarm 
themselves ideologically, be utterly passive and unprepared politic-
ally and organizationally, and end up by burying the cause of the 
proletarian revolution. (Differences) pp. 35-36.) 
In the final analysis, then, the question of peaceful transition 
is seen to involve the struggle against imperialism. This is the 
starting point and the ending point of every meaningful dis-
cussion of socialist policy in the world of today. But can a 
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militant struggle against imperialism, such as the Chinese ad-
vocate and support, be carried out without provoking a third 
world war with all its catastrophic consequences? 
Nuclear Weapons and Paper Tigers · 
The Chinese answer to this question is not spelled out in 
any detail. They simply say, in effect, that the struggle against 
imperialism helps to defend peace, not to provoke war. Pre-
sumably some such reasoning as the following underlies this 
belief. Nuclear weapons are totally irrelevant to the combatting 
of guerrilla war and other fonTIS of popular struggle, and these 
are bound to be the main fonTIS of conflict between imperialism 
and the revolutionary forces in the underdeveloped countries. 
And the Dulles doctrine of "massive retaliation" against the 
socialist countries because of their moral and/or material support 
of the revolutionaries is a recipe for suicide. Even Dulles him-
self was unable to persuade the U.S. government to apply the 
doctrine at the time of Dienbienphu, and with the power of the 
socialist countries to retaliate against any attack on them growing 
all the time, the doctrine is still less likely to be applied in the 
future. In the meantime, the revolutionary struggle weakens 
imperialism by liberating one country after another, a process 
which intensifies all the contradictions of the system and will 
eventually set the stage for its overthrow in the metropolitan 
centers themselves. 
This reasoning might seem to imply that the socialist 
countries can afford to go to any lengths to support revolutionary 
struggles in Asia, Mrica, and Latin America; and the Chinese 
are in fact accused by their opponents of taking this position. 
In order to evaluate this accusation, one must understand and 
take account of two well publicized Chinese doctrines-"despise 
the enemy strategically, take him seriously tactically" and "im-
perialism and all reactionaries are paper tigers." 
The "p.aper tiger" doctrine is really nothing but a meta-
phorical way of stating one of the most elementary and least 
controversial propositions of orthodox Marxism, that the decline 
of capitalism and its replacement by socialism on a world scale 
THE SPLIT IN THE SOCIALIST WORLD 29 
are both inevitable. In an historic.al sense, therefore, the de-
fenders of the capitalist system are powerless, they are paper 
tigers. And this is the enemy which should be despised strategic-
ally, the tenn "strategically" in this context meaning both "in 
the long run" and "as a whole." Taken together, the "despise 
the enemy strategically" and "paper tiger" doctrines are thus 
simply the Chinese way of saying what Marxists have been 
saying to the downtrodden and exploited for a long time: do 
not be overawed and cowed by the apparent might of your 
oppressors; their fate has already been sealed by history; join 
the battle now and hasten their downfall and your own libera-
tion. 
Man-eating Tigers 
All of this, however, has nothing to do with the actual 
conduct of the battle, the "tactical" aspect in the Chinese tenn-
inology. Here there are no paper tigers to be despised. Everything 
in the world, according to Mao Tse-tung, has a dual nature. 
"Imperialism and all reactionaries, looked at in essence, from 
a long-tenn point of view, from a strategic point of view, must 
be seen for what they are-paper tigers." But this is only one 
side of their nature. "On the other hand, they are also living 
tigers, iron tigers, real tigers which can eat people." (M ore on 
the Differences, p. 141, quoting Mao.) And these real man-
eating tigers are the ones that have to be fought against in 
everyday battle. Hence the principle: Take the enemy seriously 
tactically. 
What this means in more concrete terms of course depends 
on particular circumstances. But it is certainly no recipe for 
irresponsible adventurism, and the record shows that the Chinese 
have been as cautious as any other major power in ~heir conduct 
of foreign relations. While claiming their undoubted legal right 
to liberate Taiwan, they have taken no military steps to do so 
and have even refrained from occupying the offshore islands 
despite their use as sabotage and espionage bases; they have 
tolerated the colonies of Hong Kong and Macao on Chinese 
soil, waiting to solve these problems "until the time is ripe"; 
repeated charges in the U.S. press of Chinese military inter-
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vention in Laos and Vietnam seem to be without foundation;* 
and farther away from home, in Algeria and Cuba for example, 
the Chinese have given their full moral !mpport to revolutionary 
forces and have provided as much economic aid as they could 
manage but have been careful to avoid actions which could be 
considered provocative. At the same time, where they have felt 
that China itself was directly menaced or attacked, as in North 
Korea in 1950 and on the Indian border from 1959 on, the 
Chinese have not hesitated to strike back hard in self-defense. 
But what about the Chinese attitude in the Cuban crisis of 
last October? Was that not provocative? If China instead of the 
Soviet Union had been pitted against the United States, is there 
not a good chance that the world would already have gone up 
in thermonuclear flames? The Chinese answer to these questions 
is an emphatic negative. In the first place, they were s~rongly 
opposed to the introduction of missiles into Cuba; in their view, 
it was an adventurist act which simply played into the hands 
of the United States imperialists. The real deterrents to a U.S. 
attack on Cuba must be the will of the Cuban people to fight 
to the death, the condemnation of world opinion, the wrath 
of Latin America; and with respect to these deterrents the 
missiles could not but do more harm than good. In the second 
place, the Chinese were definitely not opposed to removing 
the missiles. What they were against was removing the missiles 
without consulting the Cubans, and agreeing to unilateral in-
spection by the UN-in short, they were against making a deal 
with imperialism at the expense of another nation's sovereignty. 
There is nothing in all this to indicate an adventurist or warlike 
policy on the part of the Chinese. On the contrary, it is clear 
* This particular accusation has been made so often and so em-
phatically that it may be as well to quote a person who should know the 
facts if anyone should and who certainly has no motive to cover up for the 
Chinese. In a press conference in Saigon recently, General Paul D. 
Harkins, head of the U. S. military forces in South Vietnam, briefed 
reporters on the situation in South Vietnam. According to the account 
in the Washington Post (March 6): "Harkins said the guerrillas ob-
viously are not being reinforced or supplied systematically from North 
Vietnam, China, or any place else. He said they apparently depend for 
weapons primarily on whatever they can capture. Many of their weapons, 
he said, are homemade." 
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that if Mao had been in Khrushchev's place there would have 
been no missile crisis to begin with, and the Cuban crisis, if it 
had occurred, would have taken a quite different form. 
Reform vs. Revolution 
There is one other issue which has figured prominently in 
the polemics between the Chinese and their opponents, the 
question of "structural reform" versus proletarian revolution for 
the countries of advanced capitalism. For anyone who has read 
the literature of previous "great debates" between reformists and 
revolutionaries, especially Lenin's famous tracts of 1917 and 
1918, State and Revolution and The Proletarian Revolution and 
the Renegade Kautsky, this new exchange has a very familiar 
sound. Just as Lenin in his day saw it as his first duty to revive 
and restate the true doctrines of Marx on the then burning 
issues of state and revolution, so now the Chinese see it as their 
responsibility to recall to the "modern revisionists" what Lenin 
himself said and stood for and to demonstrate that their "new" 
ideas are really not new at all and are as much at odds with 
the ideas of Marx and Lenin as were Kautsky's a half century 
ago. This is not the place for a discussion of the theory of 
"structural reform" now being propounded by Togliatti (as 
well as by various other, Communist and non-Communist, 
theorists in Western Europe). For present purposes, it is enough 
to point out that the Chinese position on the questions at issue 
is strictly orthodox Marxism-Leninism. 
The Mantle of Lenin 
One can, indeed, go further and say that on the whole 
range of subjects under dispute between the two sides, the 
Chinese arguments are purely Leninist in spirit even if not al-
ways in form (tigers, real or paper, are after all not a Russian 
specialty). The Russians and their followers, by comparison, 
are undoubtedly the modern revisionists the Chinese describe 
them as. And this accounts for one of the most striking aspects 
of the whole controversy. 
For reasons which we can only touch on here, Khrushchev 
and his associates have a great need to wear the ideological 
mantle of Lenin. By brusquely dethroning Stalin, they breached 
MONTHLY REVIEW 
the continuity of Soviet development and in a sense called into 
question the legitimacy of their own leadership. They therefore 
need to reach back, as it were, and attempt to establish a more 
basic continuity by showing that they are the real heirs of 
Lenin while Stalin was a sort of impostor. The Khrushchevian 
style is thus to pay homage to Lenin whenever a suitable op-
portunity presents itself, while relegating Stalin to a limbo of 
silence even in respect to matters where he was a faithful disciple 
of Lenin or where the weight of his authority might be most 
useful to Khrushchev. 
Now along come the Chinese with their overwhelming proof 
that Khrushchev's ideas and the political line he bases on them 
are not Leninist at all and in fact have more in common with 
the ideas and line of the people on whom Lenin focused his 
attacks just before and after the Soviet state was born. If Khrush-
chev and his associates could answer the Chinese and make out 
a plausible case that they and not the Chinese are the true 
interpreters of Lenin, that would be one thing. But this would 
obviously be a hopeless undertaking: any rational debate with 
the Chinese could only do more harm than good. The result 
is a good deal of misrepresentation and distortion of the Chinese 
position. The Chinese are accused of wanting to advance the 
cause of socialism through world war, of advocating and practic-
ing adventurist foreign policies, of stirring up premature revolts, 
of ignorance of conditions outside their own country, and so on 
and so forth. All of these charges are false, as anyone who 
knows the history of the recent past and takes the trouble to 
read the relevant Chinese literature can easily verify. In order to 
keep their own people from learning the truth of the matter, the 
Soviet leadership is therefore forced to suppress the replies of 
the Chinese to the accusations made against them. The contrast 
between the Chinese policy of publishing both sides of the 
debate and the Russian policy of publishing only one side tells 
a great deal about the debate itself. * "Since you are quite 
* One of the saddest features of the situation is the extent to which 
able leaders like Khrushchev and Togliatti, not to mention lesser figures, 
have thrown dialectical and historical materialism to the winds and have 
put in its place the most commonplace kind of pragmatism. But this is too 
large a subject to discuss within the framework of the present paper. 
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definite that our articles are wrong," say the Chinese to their 
opponents, "why don't you publish all these erroneous articles 
and then refute them point by point, so as to inculcate hatred 
among your people against the 'heresies' you call dogmatism, 
sectarianism, and anti-Marxism-Leninism? Why do you lack the 
courage to do this? Why such a stringent embargo? You fear 
the truth." (More on the Differences, p. 194.) It is, alas, hard 
to think of another reason. 
Relations among Communist Parties 
The controversy of course involves the question of relations 
among Communist parties. Even in the days of the Third Inter-
national when no member party would have dreamed of openly 
challenging Soviet leadership, the Chinese were quietly going 
their own way; and after the Second W orId War they directly 
defied Stalin's advice to enter a coalition dominated by Chiang 
Kai-shek. As Stalin himself later admitted, they were right and 
he was wrong. As a result of these experiences, the Chinese are 
used to being in a minority and have never been under the 
spell of the doctrine of Soviet infallibility, facts which help to 
explain their present stand. All Communist parties, in the Chinese 
view, are equal and none can presume to dictate to others. This 
does not exclude a party's voluntarily following the "baton" if 
it wants to (the "baton" is their euphemism for the Soviet line), 
but none is obliged to. The only line binding on all parties is 
that laid down in documents such as the Moscow Declaration 
and the Moscow Statement to which all have put their signa-
tures. (Since each party interprets these documents as it wishes, 
it is clear that in practice the commitment to abide by them 
means little.) The Russians, on the other hand, while they have 
given up any claim to exclusive leadership, argue that all parties 
ought to accept the views of the majority. This the Chinese 
deny, supporting their position with one of the classical doctrines 
of bourgeois democracy. What matters, they say, is not a majority 
but the truth; a minority which takes a principled stand for the 
truth will in due course become a majority. For their part, they 
have not the slightest doubt that they represent the truth and 
that time is on their side. As for the modern revisionists who are 
betraying Marxism-Leninism, "Let them go on creating trouble 
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if they must. The masses, and history, will pass judgment on 
them." (Mor~ on th, DifflTences, p. 193.) 
The Causes of Revisionism 
On the main issue in the controversy-whether the struggle 
for peace or the struggle against imperialism should take priority 
-we are convinced that the Chinese do indeed have the truth 
on their side. Real peace will never be achieved, much less 
guaranteed, as long as imperialism exists. And we are also 
convinced that the Chinese are right that imperialism can and 
will suffer decisive defeats at the hands of the revolutionary 
peoples of the underdeveloped countries. Weare by no means 
so sure as the Chinese seem to be, however, that the fact of their 
being right on these crucial questions means that sooner or later 
the whole international socialist movement will come around 
to their position. It is impossible to form a worthwhile opinion 
about this without an understanding of the causes of modern 
revisionism, and here unfortunately the Chinese have little to 
offer. 
Revisionism, according to the Chinese, is "bourgeois ideol-
ogy which has infiltrated into the ranks of the workers." (More 
on the Differences, p. 4.) And the vehicle for this infiltration 
is the aristocracy of labor: "Revisionism represents the interests 
of the labor aristocracy, and hence also the interests of the re-
actionary bourgeoisie." But all forms of revisionism "run counter 
to the interests of the proletariat, of the masses of the people, and 
of all oppressed people and nations." Therefore: 
One after the other, all the revisionists and opportunists who 
challenged revolutionary Marxism-Leninism have collapsed in the 
face of the truth and have been spumed by the people .... Those 
who are launching the new attacks on revolutionary Marxism-
Leninism today are just as overbearing and arrogant; yet, if they 
continue to tum a deaf ear to all advice and persist in their wrong 
course, it can be said for certain that their end will be no better 
than that of the old revisionists and opportunists. (Ibid., pp. 192-
193.) 
This theory of revisionism is, like Chinese Communist 
thought in general, pure Leninism. But unlike most of Lenin's 
ideas, it has failed to stand the test of time. Lenin tried to use 
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the theory to explain Social Democratic attitudes and policies 
in his day: he regarded Social Democracy as the creation of a 
small labor aristocracy which managed to attract a mass follow-
ing through deceit and demagogy. This became the basis of the 
policies of Communist Parties in all the countries where Social 
Democracy was strong. But these policies never worked, for the 
simple reason that the Social Democrats and not the Communists 
expressed what the workers themselves felt to be their real 
interests. The workers, in other words, were not revolutionaries 
at heart, and no amount of exhortation by the Communists 
could tum them into revolutionaries. Gradually, the Communist 
parties, though continuing to use revolutionary phraseology, ad-
justed themselves to this fact, becoming in practice reformist 
parties much like the Social Democrats. What is happening now, 
with Togliatti and the Italian CP in the lead, is simply that 
the Communist parties of the advanced capitalist countries are 
taking the last step along this road by openly embracing a 
reformist ideology. 
But this is not the only respect in which the Chinese theory 
of revisionism falls down. After all, the fountainhead of "modern 
revisionism" is not Togliatti, nor is it Tito, even if the Chinese 
often accord the latter pride of place; it is Khrushchev and his 
fellow-leaders of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Does 
it make sense to speak of bourgeois influence penetrating the 
ranks of the Soviet workers through a labor aristocracy? Should 
we not rather conclude that if this theory is wrong as applied 
to the advanced capitalist countries, it is simply irrelevant as 
applied to the Soviet Union? Perhaps the Chinese have answers 
to these questions; and if so, we would be interested to know 
what they are. In the meantime, we can ask what other possible 
causes there may be for revisionism in the Soviet Union. 
The moot plausible answer seems to be that the Soviet 
people are no more revolutionary than the workers of the ad-
vanced capitalist countries, though for different reasons. It is 
not that they have shared as junior partners in the exploitation 
of a dependent empire, but rather that they have already made 
their revolution, have succes~fully defended it in violent struggles, 
and have laid the foundations of a rapid advance to higher 
standards of living. What they want now is a long period of 
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peace and quiet in which to get on with the business in hand. 
They want peaceful coexistence and disarmament, and they 
are more than willing to believe that their own successes in 
building socialism will persuade the whole world to follow in 
their footsteps. The pressure on leaders to tell the Soviet people 
that these are attainable goals and to orient the country's policies 
accordingly would seem to be a sufficient explanation of what 
has been happening. Marxism-Leninism is in its essence, as the 
Chinese correctly insist, a revolutionary doctrine addressed to 
the oppressed and exploited of the world. How can it be ex-
pected to appeal to people who are not oppressed or exploited 
and who have no need of a revolution? 
As for the Communist parties in the advanced capitalist 
countries, they represent or seek to represent working classes 
which, objectively speaking, do share as junior partners in the 
exploitation of dependent empires. These parties either have to 
adopt policies which are acceptable to their own workers or 
else go into the political wilderness, perhaps for a long time 
to CQllle. It can be argued, and we think correctly, that it is 
better to take the latter course, to begin now to prepare for the 
day when imperialism in decline once again creates the con-
ditions for vigorous revolutionary movements in even the richest 
capitalist countries. But no qne should be surprised if established 
political parties and leaders seek to maintain their positions even 
at the expense of their time-honored principles. Under the cir-
cumstances, the apparent paradox of Communists who are also 
revisionists and reformists is seen to be really no paradox at all. 
Some Conclusions 
If this analysis is on the right track, it suggests the following 
general conclusions: 
First, Marxism-Leninism is as much as ever, perhaps even 
more than ever, the appropriate ideology for the oppressed and 
exploited majority of mankind. The Chinese as its most faithful 
and powerful champions seem certain to become the spiritual 
leaders of all genuine revolutionary movements in the world. In 
this sense, a new International is in the making, and it gives 
every sign of being the biggest and most revolutionary of all the 
internationals to date. (The strong leaning of Latin American 
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revolutionaries to the Chinese side, for example, can be clearly 
read in Eduardo Galeano's article on page 21 of the May 
1963 issue of MONTHLY REVIEW.) 
Second, the International that groups together the Soviet 
Union, the socialist countries of Eastern Europe, and the Com-
munist parties in the advanced capitalist countries seems unlikely 
either to disintegrate or change its nature in the visible future. 
Thus what has for more than forty years been an ideologically 
and politically united world Communist movement seems on the 
way to a deep and lasting split. 
What is the relation between the two Communist Inter-
nationals likely to be? It is much too early to expect to be able 
to give anything like a definitive answer to this crucially im-
portant question, but at any rate some of the relevant con-
siderations can be indicated. 
There are many good reasons why the two Internationals 
should agree to disagree on ideological questions while at the 
same time maintaining correct relations and cooperating eco-
nomically and militarily. Neither group harbors expansionist 
designs in the manner of imperialism, and both are menaced 
by imperialism. In addition, all members of both groups can 
gain through the planned development of the international 
division of labor on an ever wider scale. Objective conditions, 
therefore, would seem to favor the working out of a modus 
vivendi on mutually advantageous terms. 
On the other hand, it must be recognized that such an 
outcome is by no means assured. The Great Debate has not taken 
place entirely in the realm of polite (or not-so-polite) discourse. 
The abrupt withdrawal of Soviet technicians from China in 
1960 was deeply resented by the Chinese; so also is the failure 
of the Russians to support the Chinese in their border conflict 
wi th India. Many revolutionaries around the world are develop-
ing a deep feeling of distrust toward Khrushchev and his as-
sociates, suspecting them of hankering for deals with the im-
perialists and blaming them, at least in part, for disastrous 
defeats such as that suffered last winter in Iraq. (On this, see 
the article by Tabitha Petran in the May 1963 issue of MR.) 
The Russians, on their side, unquestionably resent what they 
consider to be a grab by the Chinese for leadership of the 
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world movement, and they will not meekly give up just because 
the Chinese have the better arguments. Other wounds and 
potential sources of conflict could be cited, but even this list is 
enough to show that there is no lack of fuel to feed the fires 
of ill-will and even hatred. It will take extraordinarily wise and 
cool leadership on both sides to prevent what is still only a 
dispute from degenerating into a mutually damaging and poten-
tially disastrous fight. Whether such leadership exists or will be 
forthcoming, time alone will tell. 
Meanwhile, those of us who are not already irrevocably 
committed to ~ne side or the other and who have the interests 
of international socialism at heart can perhaps make a con-
tribution, however small, by maintaining friendly relations with 
all groups concerned and urging upon them the desirability, 
nay the necessity, of maintaining a united front against im-
perialism, the real enemy of mankind. 
(April 12, 1963) 
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